Some of the sanctions imposed on Russia such as the exclusion of seven Russian banks from the SWIFT payment system alongside announcements by Visa and MasterCard that they were halting operations in Russia, could forewarn African countries that such measures could be visited on them if they have major policy, or strategic, differences with the West. In the same vein, South Africa, which is (after Russia) the world’s second-largest producer of palladium (a critical input in automobiles and electronics), has reported a surge in demand. Countries in this category include Tanzania that indicated that the war has led to growing Western interest in the country’s gas reserves (which are among the largest in Africa) Senegal, where over 40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas were discovered between 20, and Nigeria, which is already a supplier of liquefied natural gas to several European markets, and which additionally is embarking with Niger and Algeria on a Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline aimed at increasing exports of natural gas to European markets. For instance, some African countries are sensing opportunities from the European Union’s decision to phase out dependence on Russian oil and gas over three years and are positioning themselves to seize those opportunities. To examine these issues, this article reflects on the impact of the war on the African continent, the likely drivers of a world order beyond the war, and Africa’s possible responses to it.īeginning with sanctions, western sanctions against Russia present both threats and opportunities for Africa. More thinking is also needed into the possible global configuration of power after the war where a contest over narratives may potentially swing (even partially) in Russia’s favor. While the devastating impacts of the Russo-Ukrainian war following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 are well reported on, the secondary impact on Africa is less well understood – principally in economic terms, but also strategically.
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